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Monopolistic Competition and Costs  
in the Health Care Sector∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Abstract 
Competition among health insurers is widely considered to be a means of enhancing 
efficiency and containing costs in the health care system. In this paper, it is argued that 
this could be unsuccessful since health care providers hold a strong position on the 
market for health care services. Physicians exert a type of monopolistic power which 
can be described by Chamberlin’s model of monopolistic competition. If many health 
insurers compete with one another, they cannot counterbalance the strong bargaining 
position of the physicians. Thus, health care expenditure is higher, financing either extra 
profits for physicians or a higher number of them. In addition, health insurers do not 
have an incentive to contract selectively with health care providers as long as there are 
no  price  differences  between  physicians.  A  monopolistic  health  insurer  is  able  to 
counterbalance the strong position of physicians and to achieve lower costs. 
 
Key words:  health care system, monopolistic competition, health insurance, costs 
JEL-Codes:  I11, I18, H51, D43 
                                                 
∗  I would like to thank Toralf Pusch, Marco Sunder and Mirko Titze for helpful comments on earlier 
versions of this paper.  
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Monopolistische Konkurrenz und die Kosten  
im Gesundheitswesen∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ 
Zusammenfassung 
Wettbewerb zwischen Krankenversicherungen wird oft als Mittel zur Effizienzsteige-
rung und Kostendämpfung im Gesundheitswesen diskutiert. In diesem Papier wird ar-
gumentiert, dass er diese Funktion möglicherweise nicht erfüllt, wenn die Leistungs-
erbringer auf dem Gesundheitsmarkt über Marktmacht verfügen. Ärzte besitzen einen 
monopolistischen Vorteil, der mit Chamberlins Modell der monopolistischen Konkur-
renz  dargestellt  werden  kann.  Stehen  viele  Krankenversicherungen  miteinander  im 
Wettbewerb, können sie die starke Verhandlungsposition der Ärzte nicht ausgleichen. 
Entsprechend sind die Gesundheitsausgaben höher, womit entweder Zusatzgewinne der 
Ärzte oder eine größere Zahl an Ärzten finanziert werden. Außerdem haben die Kran-
kenversicherungen keinen Anreiz zu selektivem Kontrahieren, solange es zwischen den 
Ärzten  keine  Preisunterschiede  gibt.  Eine  Monopol-Krankenversicherung  kann  die 
starke Verhandlungsposition der Ärzte ausgleichen und niedrigere Kosten durchsetzen. 
 
Schlüsselwörter:  Gesundheitswesen, monopolistische Konkurrenz, Krankenversiche-
rung, Kosten 
JEL-Klassifikation: I11, I18, H51, D43 
                                                 
∗  Ich danke Toralf Pusch, Marco Sunder und Mirko Titze für sehr hilfreiche Kommentare zu früheren 
Versionen dieses Papiers.  
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Monopolistic Competition and Costs  
in the Health Care Sector 
1  Introduction 
Competition  among  health  insurers  is  often  discussed  as  an  instrument  to  enhance 
efficiency, particularly to contain costs, in the health care sector. But taking theories of 
health care providers’ market power into account, its suitability for this intended aim 
becomes questionable. 
Discussions about competition in the health care sector concentrate mainly on the insti-
tutional framework for competition. Questions concerning the problem of risk selection 
by health insurers, or competition among health care providers for contracts with health 
insurers, are at the centre of these discussions. Enthoven’s (1988, 1993) concept of ‘ma-
naged competition’ is widely discussed as an approach that might offer a solution to 
these problems. 
Many studies concerning the health care system argue that physicians have a type of 
market power. Evans (1974) and many other authors consider the case of physician-in-
duced demand. Physicians are better-informed about illnesses and suitable treatments 
than are their patients, therefore the patients’ demand for health care services is deter-
mined by physicians’ recommendations. Consequently, the physicians themselves create 
part of the demand for their services. Information asymmetries are at the centre of these 
discussions. 
Some authors consider monopolistic competition as a theoretical way of capturing phy-
sicians’ market power (for an overview see McGuire 2000, pp. 475 ff.; Phelps 2003,  
pp. 218 ff.). Health care services are perceived by patients as an inhomogeneous good, 
therefore physicians can achieve a kind of monopolistic power in supplying their ser-
vices. 
On the one hand, Hilsenrath (1991) and Frech (1996, pp. 5 ff.) use the monopolistic 
competitive framework as a way of capturing information asymmetries between physi-
cians and patients. Incomplete information on the part of patients is one cause of the 
perceived heterogeneity of physicians’ services. In this rationale, monopolistic compe-
tition is an effect of an information shortage and has little basis in reality. 
On the other hand, medical services are in fact a differentiated product. Even in a situa-
tion with complete information, the services of two physicians are not perfect substi-
tutes for one another. All physicians have their own personal style, diverse experience, 
particular ways to deal with certain illnesses, special interests and talents, and so on, as 
Satterthwaite (1979, pp. 485 ff.) points out. In some cases, physicians offer particular  
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services  –  for  example,  naturopathic  treatments.  Medical  services  are  not  a  homo-
geneous product.  Furthermore, the choice of  a  physician is influenced  by important 
subjective aspects. Many people have known their general practitioner for a long time 
and benefit from this long-standing relationship. The existence of personal ties between 
patient and physician, a patient’s trust in a certain person, is medically important and a 
factor that gives health care providers a limited monopolistic power. 
Previously,  questions  of  competition  among  health  insurers  and  physicians’  market 
power have mainly been discussed separately. In this paper, both aspects are linked. The 
subject of this paper is the effect of competition among health insurers on health care 
costs in case physicians have market power in terms of monopolistic competition. The 
contribution of the paper lies in the combination of the monopolistic competition ap-
proach to health care markets with competition among health insurers. It is shown that 
competition among health insurers can lead to high costs in the health care sector, be-
cause the market power of physicians is strong vis-à-vis competing health insurers. But 
physicians’ market power can be offset when there is a single health insurer with mo-
nopsonistic power on the demand side of the market for health care services. 
Some authors have already discussed the cost-containing effect of a single health insurer 
acting as monopsonist on the health care market. Pauly (1998) studies the effect of a 
monopsonistic health insurer in an otherwise competitive environment. He does not take 
into account the possibility that an insurance monopsony can partly counterbalance a 
market imperfection on the supply side for health care services. Thus, in his paper, the 
monopsony has an efficiency-decreasing effect. Hussey and Andersen (2003, pp. 219 ff.) 
also mention the cost-containing effect of an insurer’s monopsony without considering 
physicians’ market power explicitly. Colombo and Tapay (2004, pp. 35 ff.) argue that 
competing private health insurers are often the cause of higher health care expenditure 
because of their relatively weak bargaining power vis-à-vis health care providers. In 
these studies, the possibility of counteracting a market power on the supply side of the 
market is not taken into account.  
In the next section five different cases are discussed. The first two are models of com-
petition among many health insurers and physicians. In the third case there is only one 
monopolistic health insurer. The fourth possibility is the case in which the physicians 
also organize themselves as a monopolistically acting cartel, so that there is a bilateral 
monopoly on the market for health care services. The final case is a situation in which a 
fourth kind of actor enters the health care system: here, the employers choose a health 
insurer on behalf of their employees, in which case the health insurers compete for the 
employers rather than directly for insured people. 
Following the theoretical section, in the third section some stylized empirical facts are 
presented to test if they agree with the theoretical results. In the last section, the conclu-
sions are summarized and some careful political implications are drawn.  
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2  The Models 
Some Basic Assumptions 
The models described in this paper rest on the following assumptions: in the market for 
medical services there are many suppliers (that is, physicians), and many consumers (that 
is, patients). Between the two, one or several health insurers act as traders of health care 
services. The number of physicians is labeled M, and the number of health insurers  . 
Patients often have a preference for a specific physician, a result of their trust in the re-
lationship, or other factors responsible that people do not perceive physicians as perfect 
substitutes for one another. Therefore Chamberlin’s (1962) model of monopolistic com-
petition is used as an instrument to analyze the supply side of the health care market. 
If monopolistic competition results from the length of the relationship patients have 
with their preferred physicians, it is difficult for new physicians to enter the market, 
since they lack the necessary time to build up a similar relationship with a sufficient 
number of patients. Market access can also be restricted by limiting the number of uni-
versity places for medical studies or by the need to license additional physicians. In the 
following cases we shall distinguish variants with a fixed number of physicians and 
those with free market access for further physicians. This is relevant for the outcomes of 
the discussed models. 
In the models, the total demand for medical services is constant and does not depend on 
the price. If patients had to pay for their treatment themselves this assumption would not 
be true. But when everyone is insured and no private co-payments are charged, the de-
mand for medical services is price inelastic. But a constant total demand is also a useful 
approximation in the case of very severe illnesses and costly therapies. Under the as-
sumption of an exogenous constant total demand, the models are used to derive the 
price of medical services and the number of physicians endogenously. Thus problems of 
physicians’ induced demand, moral hazard and effects of payment systems on health re-
source utilization are outside the scope of this paper. 
The insured are allowed to consult only a physician on the list of their health insurer. 
They are not allowed to choose a physician who has not contracted with their health in-
surer. It is important for the outcomes of the models whether a health insurer contracts 
with only one physician (case A), is allowed to contract with as many physicians as it 
likes (cases B and E), or contracts with all physicians (cases C and D). Every insured 
person has a preferred physician. The preference for a specific physician is an important 
reason to choose a health insurer and to stay with that chosen health insurer, even when 
it raises the premium as a result of a price rise by the physician. 
Since patients have a special preference for a certain physician, a variety of physicians 
available is an important aspect of medical quality. In the models discussed here this is  
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the only way that quality is taken into account. Efforts to improve the quality of their 
services is thus not a competitive instrument for physicians. 
Three different assumptions about health insurers’ behavior are compared. When health 
insurers compete with each other it is assumed that they act as non-profit institutions 
with the aim of maximizing the number of customers (cases A, B and E). If health in-
surers sought to maximize profits, the results in these cases would be the same, since all 
profits would vanish through competition. In the case of a monopolistic health insurer 
(cases C and D) profit-maximizing behavior is unlikely, since monopolistic health in-
surers are usually organized by the government as a measure of social policy. When the 
health insurer is a monopolist it insures all members of society. Therefore maximization 
of the numbers insured cannot be its aim. For this situation, two different assumptions 
are compared: first, it is assumed that it minimizes costs; and second, that it seeks to sa-
tisfy maximally the needs of all insured people (in both cases C and D). It is assumed 
that the cost of health care provision is the only expenditure of the health insurers. 
Therefore, in all cases, the premiums of the health insurers depend entirely on the prices 
they have to pay the physicians for medical services. 
Table 1 gives an overview of the cases discussed below. They differ with respect to the 
form of the insurance market (competing insurers versus monopolist), the market for 
health care services (competing physicians versus physicians’ cartel), the number of 
physicians with whom a health insurer has contracts, and the choice of the health insurer 
(by the insured person or by his/her employer). 
Table 1: 
The five cases discussed in this paper 
Case  Insurers’  
competition 
Physicians’ competition  




Choice of health 
insurer by employer 
A  Yes  Yes  One  No 
B  Yes  Yes  Free  No 
C  No  Yes  All  No 
D  No  No  All  No 
E  Yes  Yes  Free  Yes 
 
It is assumed that all insured bear the same risk and consume an identical amount of 
health care services. Morbidity is equal among all insured people. The problem of risk 
selection by health insurers is outside the scope of this paper. Furthermore, all insured 
have  the  same  willingness  and  ability  to  pay  for  health  insurance,  thus  differences 
stemming from different income levels or preferences are also not taken into account. 
As a consequence, health insurers charge their premiums in form of a fixed amount of 
money per capita, since risk-oriented or income-related contributions produce no other 
result.  
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Case A: One Physician per Insurer 
In the first version of the model, two additional assumptions are made. First, every 
health insurer contracts with only one physician. This assumption is an approximation 
of selective contracting between health insurers and health care providers in an envi-
ronment of competitive health care markets. 
Second,  every  physician  contracts  with  only  one  health  insurer.  This  assumption 
represents competition among health insurers, which distinguish themselves by offering 
the medical services of different physicians. If there were two health insurers offering 
the services of the same physician, these insurers would be in perfect competition with 
each other, since they offer an identical good to health care consumers. Only by offering 
the services of different physicians can the health insurers distinguish themselves qua-
litatively; otherwise they would be in perfect competition. This assumption is an ap-
proximation of a stylized Managed Care setting, where health insurers contract selec-
tively and exclusively with physicians. An example is a physician employed by the 
health insurer itself. Both assumptions are relaxed in a second step in case B. 
The demand for insurance D of a single health insurer i depends on the premium compared 
with the premiums of the other health insurers. Assume the following linear function: 
   =    × [
 
  −   ×     −    ]  (1) 
Dt is total demand for insurance, which is assumed to be given. The term in square 
brackets is the market share of health insurer i.   is the total number of health insurers. 
Bi is the premium of health insurer i. Ba is the unweighted average premium of all health 
insurers. The parameter b is decisive for the effect of the premium on demand: the lower 
its own premium and the higher the premiums of the competitors, the higher the demand 
for insurance of this special health insurer i. An increase in the premium results only in 
a partial loss of customers, because every health insurer has contracted with another 
physician. Some of the insured stay with the insurer even when it raises the premium 
because of the special preference for the physician with which this insurer has con-
tracted. 
Since the expenditure of the health insurer i consists entirely of payments for health care 
providers, the premium is determined completely by the reimbursements for the phy-
sician j; that is, the physician with whom the health insurer i has contracted. Thus we 
can write: 
   =   ×      (2), 
where d is the frequency of utilization of health care services per insured person, which 
is, by assumption, constant for all insured, and Pj is the price of services of physician j. 
Consequently, the average premium for health insurers Ba is determined by the average 
price for physicians’ services Pa:  
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   =   ×      (3) 
The demand of health insurer i for health care services of a special physician j is deter-
mined by its insured clients. The demand for services E of physician j depends linearly 
on the number of health insurer i’s  insured clients: 
    =   ×     (4) 
Accordingly, total demand for medical services Et is: 
   =   ×     (5) 
Thus the demand Di for the service of insurer i can be transformed into the demand for 
health care services of a certain physician Ej by multiplying it by the frequency d and 
replacing the premium Bi by the price of the physician Pj: 
    =    × [
 
  −   ×   ×      −     ]  (6) 
M is the total number of physicians, which is here equal to the number of health insurers 
 . The demand function of the single physician j is: 
    =     +
 





   (7) 
Here 1/M is the average market share per physician and Ej/Et is the market share of phy-
sician j. Pj is the price for health care services the physician j is paid. The price of phy-
sician j is equal to the average price of all physicians Pa plus a parameter (1/bd) times 
the difference between the average market share of a physician (1/M) and the actual 
market share of physician j (Ej/Et). There is a negative relationship between the price Pj 
and the demand Ej. A price rise induces a reduction of demand for physician j, but not a 
complete loss. Because of monopolistic competition, the demand curve has the expected 
falling slope. 
The revenue of the single physician j from health insurer i is therefore: 
    ×     =     × [    +
 





 ]  (8) 
The marginal revenue MR of physician j is: 
    =     +
 
 ×  ×  
 
  − 2 ×
  
  
   (9), 
which follows, since Et = d x Dt is a constant by assumption. The higher the market 
share of a physician Ej/Et the lower is his/her marginal revenue from an additional pa-
tient. In line with the theory of monopoly, the marginal revenue of a single physician 
declines  with  increasing  quantity,  because  increasing  quantity  is  only  possible  with 
decreasing prices for all consumers.  
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By comparing Equations (9) and (7) it is clear that, for any given output, prices are 
higher than marginal revenues. If the physician maximizes profit by equalizing marginal 
costs and marginal revenue, the price charged is higher than the marginal costs. As a re-
sult  of  this  monopolistic-competitive  position,  prices  are  systematically  higher  than 
marginal costs. Monopolistic competition leads to prices higher than they would be un-
der perfect competition. 
Two variants of this case can be distinguished. In the first variant, the number of physi-
cians M is fixed and market access for additional physicians is prevented – for example, 
through the high cost of studies, a limited number of places at university, or admission 
restrictions  for  new  physicians.  Physicians  achieve  extra  profits  when  their  price 
exceeds not only marginal but also average costs. Since no additional physicians are 
allowed to enter the market, this extra profit cannot induce an increase in the number of 
physicians and is thus prevented from being eliminated by increasing competition. 
Things change when – as a second variant – there is free access to the market for further 
physicians. As long as physicians can achieve extra profits there is an incentive for new 
ones to enter the market. According to Equations (6) and (9), a rising number of physi-
cians M leads to less demand and falling marginal revenues for each physician. The 
number of health insurers has to increase along with the rising number of physicians. As 
a consequence, every physician faces a diminished demand and sets his price at a lower 
level. With an increasing number of physicians, prices decrease until all extra profits 
disappear. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these two variants. They show the profit-maximizing behavior 
of one physician under the condition of a typical U-shaped marginal cost curve. The 
physician chooses the price at which marginal revenues and marginal costs are equal. 
This price P1 is higher than the physician’s average costs minimum, which was realized 
under perfect competition (Pp). In the situation illustrated in Figure 1, the physician’s 
price is also above his/her average costs. Thus s/he gains an extra profit, but this extra 
profit holds only if market access is restricted. 
If market access is free, extra profit attracts additional physicians. In accordance with 
Equation (6), the demand for the services of a single physician decreases when the total 
number of physicians M increases. Every single physician suffers from a loss of demand 
and a decreasing price. This process stops when the demand curve of the single physi- 
cian has shifted so far to the left that it touches the average cost curve in its falling part 
(‘Chamberlin’s tangent’; Chamberlin 1962, pp. 83 ff.). Extra profits vanish with an ex-
pansion of supply. Prices fall to P2 in Figure 2, but do not reach the low level under per-
fect competition Pp. The costs of medical services remain higher than under perfect 
competition but are reduced with a higher number of physicians. Physicians still work at 
production costs above the possible minimum that would be reached under perfect com-
petition. 
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Figure 1: 
Average costs, demand and price setting of a single physician under monopolistic com-
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As a result, prices and the costs of production are higher than under a regime of perfect 
competition. If there is free market access for further physicians, the number of physi-
cians rises beyond the number with minimum costs. Free market access leads to lower 
prices, but they are still above the level under perfect competition. 
For a judgment regarding efficiency under the precondition of a constant total quantity 
of health care services, it is necessary to take both costs and quality into account. In this 
highly abstract model, quality is measurable only by the number of physicians, since a 
greater variety increases the probability of finding an individually trustworthy doctor. 
The case with open market access for physicians is unambiguously superior to the case 
with restricted market access, since prices are lower and variety is greater. Comparing 
with a situation of perfect competition, efficiency effects are impossible to determine – 
under perfect competition costs are lower, but the variety of physicians is also lower. 
To sum up: the market for health care services has higher costs than it would have under 
perfect competition, as a result of the personal links between patients and their physi-
cians. The higher costs either lead to extra profits for the physicians or finance a higher 
number of physicians. 
 
Case B: More than One Physician per Insurer 
If health insurers are allowed to contract with more than one physician, the demand side 
is affected by the number of physicians a health insurer has under contract. Since the in-
sured persons have a preference for a particular physician, the insurer can increase its 
potential number of insured clients by contracting with more physicians. Therefore the 
demand for a single insurer i changes to: 
   =    × [
 
  −   ×     −     +   ×     −    ]  (10) 
Mi is the number of physicians the insurer i has under contract. Ma is the average num-
ber of physicians with whom the health insurers have contracts. The results depend on 
whether all physicians charge the same price or different prices. 
When all physicians  are faced with identical demand functions they charge the same 
price. This holds when all physicians are equally popular among the insured.
1 In this case, 
the health insurer can maximize its market share by contracting with as many physicians 
as possible. Any enlargement of the number of contracted physicians leads potentially 
to more insured clients as long as this does not affect the premium Bi. In this situation it 
is rational for every competing health insurer to contract with all physicians. But if all 
health insurers do so, not only Mi but also Ma rises. Ultimately, the term (Mi – Ma) is 
zero and no health insurer can win a higher market share, but a health insurer that 
                                                 
1  Price differences resulting from cost differentials are possible, albeit less likely to be important. Here 
they are not explicitly taken into account.  
IWH  __________________________________________________________________ 
 
IWH Discussion Papers 17/2009 
14
excludes a physician would lose some insured clients. Even if health insurers are al-
lowed to contract selectively, it is not rational for them to do so. The cause is the same 
as in case A: consumers have an individual preference for a single physician of their 
own choice. When their health insurer does not contract with their preferred physician, 
they are inclined to change the health insurer rather than the physician. The reason is 
that physicians are not perfect substitutes for one another, while insurers are. 
If the physicians are not equally popular, the prices they can negotiate are different. 
Some of the physicians face a higher demand than others and can therefore charge a 
higher fee. A health insurer contracting with physicians charging different prices must 
transform these different prices into a uniform premium. In this way, the patients of 
physicians  charging  lower  prices  subsidize  costlier  physicians  respectively  their  pa-
tients. This brings about an incentive for health insurers to contract selectively with 
physicians. A health insurer contracting only with physicians charging lower prices can 
entice all patients with a personal preference for these physicians away from health in-
surers who have also contracted with costlier physicians. For insured with a high pre-
ference for a certain physician, all health insurers contracting with this physician are 
perfect  substitutes  for  one  another  concerning  medical  quality  and  are  therefore  in 
strong  price  competition.  In  this  case,  monopolistic  competition  among  physicians 
corresponds  to  perfect  competition  at  the  level  of  health  insurance.  In  this  price 
competition, the health insurer who does not contract with costlier physicians is the 
winner. As a consequence, the market for health insurance splits into segments with 
cheaper and costlier physicians. Eventually there will be at least as many health insurers 
as physicians with different prices. This result is quite similar to case A, since a health 
insurer is not able to contract with several physicians at different prices. 
 
Case C: Only One Health Insurer 
In the third case, there is one monopolistic health insurer, which contracts with all phy-
sicians. This reflects the situation in many European countries, where health insurers do 
not compete with each other and negotiate centrally with all health care providers, or 
where the government acts as the health insurer via a department of the administration. 
In this case the health insurer acts as a monopsonist vis-à-vis health care providers. This 
gives the insurer the negotiating power to set the price for medical services. The way it 
makes use of this market power depends on its aims. 
First, it is assumed that the health insurer seeks to minimize costs. When the health in-
surer has sufficient knowledge about costs it can force down the price to the level of the 
minimum average cost of a physician (Pp in Figures 1 and 2). As a consequence, some 
physicians leave the market. Eventually the number of physicians is exactly equal to the 
total demand divided by the quantity of services a physician can provide at minimum 
cost. For a single physician, the situation is like perfect competition with quantity re- 
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striction: s/he knows the price on the market and can adapt his/her supply of health care 
services to the price fixed by the health insurer. As long as the total supply of all physi-
cians is above the fixed total demand for health care services, some physicians suffer 
from losses and leave the market. This process stops when the number of physicians is 
reduced to the minimum necessary to provide all patients with the demanded quantity of 
medical treatment. 
An alternative assumption is that the monopsonistic health insurer wants to maximize 
consumer welfare by an optimal compromise between price and variety of physicians. 
Under this assumption, the health insurer chooses a higher price in order to increase the 
number of physicians to a level in accordance with consumers’ preferences. By setting 
the price, the monopsonistic insurer determines the number of physicians. 
Pauly (1998) points out that, in the case of a textbook-like monopsony, a welfare loss 
occurs that stems from a lower demand at lower prices. In the models discussed in this 
paper this welfare loss is impossible, because total demand for health care services is 
completely inelastic. Therefore the monopsony can enforce lower prices for a constant 
amount of medical services. The suppliers have to accept a welfare loss resulting from a 
reduction in their remuneration and partially from a reduction of the number of physi-
cians. If the insurer knew the utility function of the insured it could choose the utility-
maximizing solution. 
It is assumed above that health insurers’ premiums consist entirely in the expenditures 
for physicians’ services, because either the insurer is a non-profit institution with no 
motivation to increase prices, or this is enforced by competition. If the health insurer is 
a monopsonist on the market for medical services, it is likely that it acts as a monopolist 
on the market for insurance. If the health insurer seeks profits, it raises its premiums. 
Since demand is totally price inelastic, there is theoretically no limit to a rise in pre-
miums. In reality, monopolistic health insurers in industrialized countries are non-profit 
organizations; in many cases they are part of the public administration. Thus they do not 
seek profit maximization. Health insurers are influenced by political pressure to stabi-
lize premiums, especially in countries where employers have to pay a part of the pre-
miums. 
 
Case D: Bilateral Monopoly on the Market for Health Care Services 
In many health care markets, not only is the insurer a monopsonist, but the suppliers of 
medical services also cartelize. One reason is an attempt to reduce the transaction costs 
of price negotiations. This occurs, for example, in many countries where physicians are 
members of unions or professional associations; they are able to attain a bargaining 
power equal to that of the monopsonistic insurer. As a consequence, a bilateral mono-
poly is emerging in the market for health care services. This is an approximation to 
structures  typical  of  many  countries  that  have  negotiations  between  centralized  in- 
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surance  bodies  and  physicians’  associations  (Hofmarcher  and  Durand-Zaleski  2004,  
pp. 210 ff.). 
In the case of a bilateral monopoly under the assumption of an exogenous constant total 
demand, the price is not determined by a model of the kind mentioned above. For health 
care providers, the lowest average costs determine the lowest acceptable price for the 
physicians’ cartel. Two variants can be distinguished. 
In the first variant there is no free market entry for additional physicians. If the price is 
above the minimum average cost, physicians achieve an extra profit, as in the first va-
riant of case A. The physicians’ cartel has a strong interest in striving for higher prices 
in order to gain this extra profit of its members. Since a higher price does not bring 
about any improvement in medical quality, the health insurer aims to press the price 
down to its minimum level. Because of these diverging interests, a price agreement is 
not easy to achieve. 
In the second variant there is unhindered market access for further physicians. Any price 
above the minimum level creates an incentive for further physicians to enter the market. 
All extra profits made by physicians vanish through an expansion of supply. Thus the 
physicians’ cartel only has an incentive to bargain for higher prices if it strives for a 
growth in its membership. Since a higher price does not bring about extra profit for ex-
isting members, the cartel’s engagement in price rises is weaker than in the first variant. 
The health insurer may be interested not only in cost containment but also in a greater 
variety of physicians available for the insured. Thus it may agree to a price higher than 
the minimum average cost of a physician. The conflict of interest between the phy-
sicians’ cartel and the health insurer may be less severe than in the first variant. 
 
Case E: The Employer as Sponsor of Health Care Insurance 
Competition among health insurers leads to different outcomes when people are insured 
by a group policy rather than individually; for example, all the members of a company. 
In the simple case considered here, the employer chooses one insurance policy for all 
his employees. Since the health insurer is chosen by the employer on behalf of the 
insured, the personal relationship between insured person and physician does not have 
any impact on the choice of health insurer. The health insurer purchasing medical ser-
vices from physicians is not influenced by the threat that the patients of a particular 
physician might cancel the insurance policy. The physicians thus lose their monopolistic 
position. Price considerations become the only criterion in the choice of insurer. As a 
consequence, the markets for insurance and for medical services mutate into markets 
under perfect competition. 
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The Intuition of the Results 
Since medical services offered by different physicians are not perfect substitutes for one 
another,  patients  have  a  preference  for  a  certain  physician.  This  results  in  strong 
bargaining power on the part of physicians vis-à-vis health insurers. Competing health 
insurers  are  not  able  to  counter  physicians’  strong  price-setting  position,  since  the 
insured are willing to pay higher premiums for the possibility of consulting their pre-
ferred physician. A health insurer that refuses to contract with a certain physician risks 
the loss of some insured clients. This is why, as long as there are no price differentials 
among physicians, competing health insurers do not have any reason to make use of 
selective contracting with health care providers. Because of physicians’ market power, 
competition among health insurers leads to prices above the minimum average cost. A 
monopolistic  health  insurer,  acting  as  monopsonist  vis-à-vis  physicians,  has  the 
negotiating power to enforce lower prices, but acting in the interests of the insured it 
may also be willing to pay a price above the minimum cost in return for a larger number 
of physicians, and thus a greater variety for the patients. Results are rather ambivalent 
when the monopsonistic health insurer finds a cartel of health care providers on the 
supply side of the market. Another possible way of reducing prices is a system in which 
the insured lose the free choice of both the insurer and the physician. When the insurer 
is chosen solely for cost reasons, competition is strong enough to force prices down to 
the level of the minimum average cost. This is probably not efficient,  since quality 
aspects and the variety of physicians are neglected in this situation.  
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3  Some Empirical Findings 
For an overview of the empirical relevance of the theoretical results, some stylized facts 
and some anecdotal evidence about health care systems in different countries are dis-
cussed. The purpose of this chapter is not to give an exact empirical test of the theoreti-
cal results, but rather to provide a short overview of some facts that might be explained 
by the models above. 
There are only a few countries with a predominance of competition among health in-
surers. In most health insurance systems, a department of the government or a parafiscal 
insurance body acts as monopolistic health insurer. 
An international comparison of health care expenditures shows that the two countries 
with the longest tradition of competition among health insurers – Switzerland and the 
United States – have high costs of health care provision both as a percentage of gross 
domestic product (GDP) and in US dollar per capita at purchasing power parities (PPP) 
(see Figure 3). Countries with some limited competition among health insurers have 
also relatively high health care expenditures (Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands), as 
well  as  other  countries  with  Bismarck-style  independent  insurance  bodies  (such  as 
France and Austria). Exceptions to this rule are countries with a low GDP per capita, or 
former socialist countries. Apart from these cases there is a tendency for countries with 
a directly state-driven health insurance system to have lower health care expenditures 
than countries with independent insurance bodies or a situation of competition among 
health insurers. A possible explanation is that competing or independent health insurers 
have weaker bargaining power vis-à-vis health care providers than does the state as mo-
nopsonistic health care purchaser. 
Econometric investigations support these impressions: across various studies, the most 
robust predictor for health care spending is per capita income (for an overview, see 
Docteur and Oxley 2003, pp. 73, 79–81; Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000). In addition, the 
degree to which the state acts as purchaser of health care services correlates signifi-
cantly with health care expenditures in a negative way (Kumpmann 2008, pp. 433 ff.). 
The strong preference for a specific physician among the insured is an explanation of 
why physicians have such a strong position when negotiating with health insurers. In 
reality there are some further causes for health care providers’ market power. Physicians 
often cartelize in unions or physicians’ associations. Particularly in rural areas and in the 
case of special deseases, some hospitals exert market power, since they act as natural 
monopolies.  Physicians  have  an  informational  advantage,  which  gives  them  some 
market power. All these kinds of strong market positions can be countered by a mono-
psonistic health insurer rather than by competing insurers. The model of monopolistic 
competition discussed above is one (but not the only) explanation of a market asym-
metry compensated by a monopsonistic health insurer.    
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Figure 3a: 
Total health expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 2007 
 
Figure 3b: 
Total health expenditure per capita in PPP US dollars, 2007 
 
Black  bars:  Countries  with  a  long  tradition  of  relatively  intense  competition  among  health  insurers;  grey  bars: 
countries with independent insurance bodies, some of them with some limited competition among health insurers; 
white bars: countries with a predominantly state-driven health care system.  
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The international comparison also shows that countries where the state acts as health in-
surer and buys medical services from physicians and other providers have lower costs 
for their health care systems than countries with independent, albeit monopolistic, in-
surance bodies. In the former, health care services are purchased by the government and 
financed predominantly by taxes. In the latter, health care services are financed predo-
minantly by contributions, and in consequence the insured enjoy a well-defined right to 
treatment in return for their contributions. Along with the considerations of case C in a 
system with well-defined patients’ rights, the monopolistic health insurer is more in-
clined to weigh cost containment against variety of medical services. Thus an indepen-
dent insurance body may choose a higher price in return for a greater number of physi-
cians. In contrast to this, a department of the government does not have the commitment 
to provide a specific amount, variety or quality of health care services in return for taxes 
paid. Thus the government could be predominantly motivated by cost containment poli-
cies. This may be an explanation for the observation that, in government-driven health 
care systems, expenditures are even lower than in countries with monopolistic indepen-
dent insurance bodies. 
In  the  Netherlands,  health  policy  has  been  aimed  for  almost  two  decades  towards 
strengthening competition among health insurers. In 1992, the insured were given the 
right to choose their health insurer freely. Since that time, health insurers have been 
allowed to contract selectively with physicians, and since the most recent reform of the 
health care system in 2006 they can also contract selectively with hospitals. But hardly 
any of them has made use of these possibilities (Douven et al. 2007, p. 9; Leu et al. 
2009, p. 18). Providers’ remunerations are regulated by the government. In the field of 
primary care, prices are limited to a maximum amount. Hospital charges are also largely 
regulated, albeit the proportion of freely negotiable prices is rising (Leu et al. 2009, p. 18). 
According to the considerations in case B, it is plausible that in the Netherlands a health 
insurer that excludes, for example, a general practitioner from its list would lose at least 
some of its patients as insured clients as well. Greß et al. (2001, p. 20) mention that 
most of the insured have closer links with their physician than with their health insurer. 
The only rationale for selective contracting – price differentials between health care pro-
viders – was prevented by governmental regulation. This is an explanation in line with 
case B for the reluctance of health insurers to contract selectively with health care pro-
viders.  
Private  health  insurance  companies  play  an  important  part  as  insurers  for  risks  not 
covered by the regular social health system, especially in Canada, Australia and Swit-
zerland. Gechert (2009, p. 9) points out that these private insurers normally do not re-
strict the free choice of medical practitioner by the insured. Rather, they act as mere 
payers in the system of health care provision. One reason (among others) for this is the 
high preference among customers for freedom of choice. Even in the field of private 
competition,  the  competing  insurers  lack  the  incentive  to  contract  selectively  with 
physicians.   
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In the United States, many employees de facto do not have a free choice of health in-
surer, because their employers offer them only a limited number of health plans, and 
bear the cost of a proportion of the premiums. Among those who receive such health 
benefits from their employers, 46 per cent are offered only one health plan (Collins et 
al. 2006, p. 6, fig. 4). Traditionally, most health plans were indemnity schemes with no 
restriction on the free choice of medical practitioner. The US health system suffered 
from very high and strongly increasing health care expenditures. During the 1980s and 
1990s, selective contracting became much more widespread in the USA in the form of 
Managed Care organizations such as the Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 
This was motivated partly by employers, for the purpose of cost containment. On the 
one  hand,  this  resulted  in  considerable  cost  savings,  but  on  the  other,  health  care 
consumers pressed for more individual choice among health care providers, and politi-
cal  pressure  to  guarantee  more  patients’  rights  rose  significantly.  This  resulted  in  a 
growing number of new laws on patients’ rights. Health insurers responded by offering 
new products with more freedom of choice for patients. Subsequently, health care ex-
penditures were increasing faster again (Docteur et al. 2003, pp. 14 ff.). 
As long as most of the offered health plans were indemnity schemes, the free choice of 
medical practitioner was guaranteed and physicians exerted a market power that al-
lowed them to charge relatively high prices, either from the health insurer or directly 
from patients. Cost containment was achieved in return for a loss of consumer choice: 
the choice among health insurers was limited by the employer; and the choice among 
health care providers was limited by the health insurer. When the health insurers are al-
lowed to restrict the patients’ choice of medical practitioner they gain the market power 
to reduce prices. Since patients have more consumer rights once more, cost containment 
has been less successful in the USA. 
To sum up, some of the stylized facts about health care systems in industrialized coun-
tries can be understood with the help of the models described in this paper. More em-
pirical scrutiny would be necessary to corroborate or to weaken these connections. Fur-
ther studies might take into account other influencing factors such as the risk selection 
behavior of health insurers, and income differences.  
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4  Conclusion and Political Implications 
The model of monopolistic competition is used as an approach to analyze the bargaining 
power of health care providers. Assuming that patients have an individual relationship 
with their physicians, it is possible to analyze the supply of health care services by 
means of this model. Under these circumstances, costs are high when health insurers 
compete with each other, because physicians can achieve higher remuneration. This 
brings about either extra profits for physicians or an increase in the number of physi-
cians. Lower costs are possible either if the health insurer has a monopsonistic position 
on the health care market or in a situation where the insured lose both the free choice of 
medical practitioner and the free  choice of health insurer. Competition weakens the 
bargaining  power  of  health  insurers  vis-à-vis  health  care  providers.  Thus  increasing 
competition among health insurers might not bring about lower costs.  
In this framework, the special strength of physicians stems from their individual rela-
tionship with patients, which is also an aspect of medical quality. Since quality compe-
tition is not included in the models above, this paper contributes more to the explanation 
of costs in the health care sector than to the question of efficiency. The only conclusion 
concerning quality in this paper is the insight that a higher number of physicians brings 
about  not  only  stronger  price  competition  but  also  a  greater  variety  for  patients 
searching  for  a  doctor.  This  might  furthermore  enhance  quality  competition  among 
health care providers. In any case, an efficiency-enhancing policy should support open 
market access for additional suppliers as long as they meet the conditions to be a profes-
sional physician. This includes an improvement of information for patients about newly 
entering physicians, to make the greater variety of physicians effectively accessible for 
patients, and in this way to support their rational choice of a medical practitioner.  
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